

Oroville Spillways Community Meetings Gridley, California on April 27, 2017, 5:30 pm Meeting Summary

This meeting in Gridley was the first of a series of community meetings convened by the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) in April and May 2017, with the objective of providing the following:

- Opportunities in multiple locations for members of the public to learn about the response and recovery effort
- Opportunities for members of the public to communicate directly with DWR staff about questions and perspectives
- Information on ways to provide additional feedback to DWR.

This document summarizes the presentation to the Gridley community on the Oroville spillways response, recovery, and other community topics. It also captures public comments and clarifying questions and DWR staff responses. It is not intended to serve as a detailed transcript of the meeting.¹

This document is organized into the following main sections:

1. Introduction
2. Presentation
3. Questions and Comments
4. Action Items

A full video of the meeting is available online at <https://youtu.be/C6liDCvG3Tw>.

Introduction

Mike Harty, Facilitator, opened the meeting, reviewed the agenda, and provided meeting guidelines. Bill Croyle, Acting Director of DWR, welcomed participants and said he was sorry for the Oroville Dam Emergency Response impacts on meeting participants and others. Director Croyle indicated that work related to the emergency response has now shifted into a long-term recovery effort. Through these public information sessions, DWR is committed to responding to stakeholder comments and questions ensuring the spillway flow capacity of 270,000 cfs, with additional capacity over an improved emergency spillway by November 1, 2017. The intent is to safely pass all flows through the gated main spillway. Director Croyle noted that DWR continues to monitor and manage snowmelt runoff and expects to close the spillway in early May and then reopen it for a short period of time before construction begins on the spillway. Before introducing California elected representatives and a representative from the Sheriff's office, the Director reemphasized DWR's interest in engaging with meeting participants and its commitment to listening and addressing comments and questions from all participants.

California State Senator Jim Nielsen made brief remarks, noting that the Senate is holding hearings on the Oroville Emergency Response topic and that he is working to get answers and resolution to issues. Senator Nielsen assured participants that errors made in the past will not be repeated and emphasized

¹ Where appropriate DWR has added a "NOTE" that reflects subsequent investigation to ensure factual accuracy.

the importance of the entire flood management system beyond the dam. Senator Nielsen reminded participants that he and DWR staff are working on behalf of residents and that public safety is of paramount concern to them

California State Assembly member James Gallagher shared that his family was among those evacuated, as were numerous meeting participants. Assemblyman Gallagher noted DWR staff's commitment to an open dialogue with him and their responsiveness about convening public meetings and releasing the Board of Consultants reports.

Lt. James Bell of the Oroville Sheriff's office represented Sherriff Kory Honea in expressing the Sheriff's commitment to collaborating with DWR staff to ensure public safety.

Presentation

Director Croyle delivered a brief presentation on the Oroville Emergency Response and Recovery process and the current status of operations. The Director emphasized that the dam itself was not impacted by the event. He reviewed the structure of the spillways and the timeline over which the primary spillway failed in early and mid-February. The Director noted the unprecedented meteorological conditions that required the controlled but rapid release of water from the reservoir onto the damaged spillway. He reviewed the proposed approach to restoration and mitigation which focuses first on repairing the upper chute of the spillway, and then addressing the lower chute and the emergency spillway, which DWR is not planning to use again, but which it will still repair to ensure erosion prevention.

Public Comment and Question Session:

Following the brief presentation, DWR staff reserved time for a lengthy public question and comment session, during which participants had the opportunity to express many of their concerns and clarify pressing questions regarding the spillways response and recovery effort. During this session, DWR staff addressed nearly 40 questions and comments from meeting participants. The following comments, questions and responses were recorded (Q= question, R= response, C= comment) during the meeting.

- Question (Q): How much water can flow through Hyatt Power Plant?
 - DWR Response (R): Currently, 7,000 cfs can flow through the Hyatt Power Plant, as the turbine is out of place. When all turbines are operating, the capacity of the Plant is approximately 13,000 cfs. The two river valves that will be functional in the coming weeks can add 4,000 cfs for a total of 17,000 cfs in capacity, when all the turbines and river valves are fully functioning.
- Q: Why do you need more than the capacity of Hyatt Power Plant to deal with inflows to the reservoir?
 - R: As there is a limit to the size of the Power Plant turbines that can be linked to the grid, peak reservoir inflows can occasionally exceed turbine outflow capacity, requiring use of the spillway to maintain space for inflows/flood storage.
- C: It appears that DWR does not conduct drug screenings with contractors it hires to work on spillway repairs. This lack of due diligence can compromise public safety. Therefore, in order to maximize public safety, DWR should require a drug screening of each employee/person working on the spillway, including contractors.

- **Q:** Why did DWR prioritize informing the radio station (KOYO), at which I work and specific groups like the jail inmates and the Oroville Rescue Mission, of the pending evacuation over other groups such as mobile home and senior residents, who were notified very late in the process? I believe it was DWR's responsibility.
 - **R:** Lt. Bell clarified that DWR does not have the role of evacuating communities, and that it is the responsibility of the Sheriff's department to initiate evacuations. DWR is involved to the extent that it informs the Sheriff's decision to evacuate. Distinct challenges (e.g., transportation availability) to safely evacuating certain communities, like care homes, seemingly delayed evacuation notifications to those groups. Director Croyle indicated that his staff will review the evacuation process for your specific group and respond.
- **Q:** Why is DWR holding water in the reservoir when pending snowmelt threatens to overflow the lake? Is DWR withholding water for use by southern California water purveyors like Metropolitan Water District (MWD)? Can the spillways not handle more than 35,000 cfs? DWR must increase outflow to the spillway until lake elevation is 835 feet and should only be allowed to re-fill the lake once a functional spillway and emergency spillway is in place.
 - **R:** The spillway can handle flows higher than 35,000. DWR planned to close the spillway by May 1, after which point DWR will be required to open it again once enough head is built up on the gates to safely discharge water (~860 feet lake elevation). DWR will consult with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on a final lake elevation reading before closing the gates for construction. Typically, the water level in the reservoir is far lower than 835 feet within a month. DWR cannot speak on behalf of MWD, but MWD does not have the capacity to store additional water. DWR is factoring in water supply and environmental needs, and will not be storing water up against the gate. While the operations plan is not yet finalized, DWR can share it once it is complete.
- (50) **Q:** My concern is about DWR's governance structure. Who makes DWR's rules and policies about what it can and cannot do? Where can a member of the public find meeting minutes and any process plans for dam maintenance?
 - **R:** DWR employs more than 3,600 people. Staff report to Acting Director Croyle, who in turn reports to John Laird, the Secretary of Natural Resources. The Secretary is accountable to the office of Governor Jerry Brown. Director Croyle specified that he and Chief Deputy Cindy Messer are tasked with briefing the senior policy advisor and chief of staff to the Governor weekly. DWR's rules and procedures are established under the California Water Code and its administrative processes. Please refer to the DWR website where you will find information about the Oroville Response and Recovery process.
- **C:** I have evacuated Oroville four times (e.g., 1964, 1986, 1997 & 2017). My concern is with the annual operation manual of Oroville dam. The operational manual has not proven effective, and only now is DWR offering to share it publicly, after decisions have already been made. I would like to request more transparency from DWR in this regard. An example of the impact of DWR's lack of transparency is when the community lost the opportunity for additional capacity of 150,000 Acre Feet (AF) of storage above Oroville dam as a result of DWR's decision not to build the Marysville dam. This decision also compromised system flood control capacity, which has also resulted in loss of life. How much more information will DWR continue to not share

publicly, even as the public are reviewing operating manuals, water contracts, etc. The community prefers to partner with DWR throughout this important discussion and decision-making process regarding the spillways response and recovery rather than being informed after the fact.

- **A:** This is an important perspective to hear. DWR did not pass 150,000 cfs over the emergency spillway; only 12,000 cfs went over the spillway, and this was not by design. The erosion in the emergency spillway was not anticipated, as the spillway underwent a regulatory vetting process and was deemed acceptable. The water that was released via the damaged spillway had to be passed through the spillway to mitigate for flood risk. Part of DWR's decision-making process is to reevaluate the reservoir's flood rule curve, and consider whether more flood storage is needed.
- **Q:** Is there an [inundation] floodplain map available to the public [in the case of spillway/dam failure]? People are more likely to evacuate if they know their risks and the proper evacuation locations or sites. There was a lot of confusion as to where to go in the February evacuations.
 - **R:** There are a number of different kinds of maps such as the FEMA map pertinent to 100 or 500-year flood events. The Butte County Sheriff's Department has refined their version of the flood evacuation map, organized by zones, which is available to the public. DWR has an emergency spillway hypothetical inundation map, including assembly points, shelters, etc., and can also make it available to the community.
- **Q:** Why, after all these years, has there not been an annual inspection and maintenance program implemented?
 - **A:** The Oroville Dam facility is inspected by DWR's Division of Safety of Dams, FERC, and an independent consultant team. The inspection protocol requires that 3-5 independent entities (2 regulatory agencies and third party) conduct inspections. The most recent inspection involved approximately 20 independent people. Certain inspection information and maintenance records are publicly available. *NOTE: This response incorporates additional information identified by DWR to ensure factual accuracy.*
- **C:** I am a walnut farmer and the Oroville operations are jeopardizing my crops, which comes at a great financial cost to me. DWR's decision to release flows at an excess level of 35,000 cfs rather than a steady flow of 20,000 cfs due to the dysfunctional river valves and a mismanaged system has resulted in overflow of water through my farms and pumping stations. I know this as my crew was working in the river when we were notified of an outflow increase from 36,000 cfs to 40,000, with almost no warning so we could safely evacuate. I now have 250 acres of my farm underwater, and it will take up to two weeks to dry out my crops. How can I get refunded for my loss? The system should be able to release a steady 20,000 cfs to fill the river which would not compromise adjacent agriculture.
 - **R:** Behzad Soltanzadeh, introduced himself as DWR's Chief Engineer (Division of O&M), handling the incident command February 7th through March and responded to the participant's comment. He indicated that both the Hyatt Power Plant turbines and the river valves discharge flows to diversion tunnels. Further, he confirmed that the river outlet was non-operational for a couple years as the regulatory approvals needed to reinstate the valves were only recently secured. The river outlet will be operational within the next week, and they will be able to repair the sediment damage from the

spillway incident. Mike Harty confirmed that a DWR staff member will connect with Brad Foster (Foster Farms) following the meeting to better understand his concerns.

- **C:** There is a leak in the dam above the Hyatt Power Plant, which has been there for a number of years. The grass visually apparent at that location is evidence that there is a leak and further, when the lake level decreases, the grass dies. Please release the flow before it overflows and the dam will flood the area again.
 - **R:** The grass and moisture have been monitored and documented since early stages of construction of the dam. DWR has determined that water is not leaking through the dam from the reservoir in these areas. DWR will make available specific inspection documents to address this concern. Director Croyle emphasized that DWR staff will answer this question in writing and directly provide documentation, including a full description of background behind the grass as determined by DWR and other regulatory agencies. *NOTE: This response incorporates additional information identified by DWR to ensure factual accuracy.*
- **Q:** How much has the response cost for the spill incident?
 - **R:** The known and projected emergency response costs totals \$247M. In anticipating the next question, Director Croyle indicated that recovery and reconstruction is expected to cost \$275M.
- **Q:** Who is responsible for these response costs?
 - The State Water Contractors will be responsible for these costs, and DWR is further requesting Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) funding for response and recovery costs, in an effort to maximize the refunds through federal funds. Constituents of water districts that benefit from and served by the State Water Project will likely bear some of the cost burden.
- **C:** On behalf of sports fisherman, DWR should commit to the following: 1) that the Feather River Hatchery will raise an extra two million salmon to mitigate fish loss due to the crisis; 2) proposing a service charge of \$20 per AF of water sold to agricultural and municipal interests to rehabilitate fish and wildlife; and 3) immediately restoring spawning gravel that was scoured below the hatchery for spring run chinook salmon spawning activities. We expect that we lost 1,000,000 king salmon due to transportation trauma and other downstream impacts. I am happy to volunteer my time to help with this effort as I have a lot of experience and knowledge of the system. DWR should consider engaging a bipartisan, private group to support these efforts.
 - **R:** Director Croyle stated that he was not aware of the \$20 tax (which the participant indicated was his own proposal). Further, he commented that DWR cannot speak to the replacement of spawning beds, as that falls to the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), but this action is a part of the recovery effort. High snow melt flows will continue for next couple of weeks which will challenge in-river habitat projects. DWR understands that very few fish were lost during the emergency due to an unprecedented effort to move hatchery fish. Jeanne Kuttel contributed to this conversation and stated that the fisheries will continue to be a part of the conversation moving forward, and DWR will be working with CDFW on fish-related issues. DWR staff will also follow up on this topic.

- **C:** On behalf of river sportsmen, we are concerned about the downstream effects of the Oroville crisis and general dam management. This problem had been brought to DWR's attention in the past. DWR's dam management has caused bank erosion at high flows and silt deposits at low flows that create in-river hazards for river users and compromise fish habitat, and that cause economic hardship for farmers. We need to clean up the Feather River from Gridley and continuing downriver.
 - **R:** As a first step, DWR shared the URL for the Department of General Services, which provides the process for negatively impacted parties to file a claim with the state
- **C:** My engineering firm invested significant time to proposing a recovery solution that combines the two spillways. After having provided DWR with the plans, we have still not received any feedback. We decided to file the documents with FERC. At this time, will DWR still consider this proposal as an alternate solution? The contract documents released by DWR do not actually address the erosion challenges on the emergency spillway when water is spilled over the top of it. As a result, there will continue to be safety issues. The contractor, Kiewit, has designated 15-25% of their bid for mobilization (which is equivalent to \$45-55M), which should instead be spent on increasing the size of the spillway to accommodate both streams of water (the controlled gated spillway and the emergency spillway). You noted that by November 1, you will be able to accommodate 100,000 cfs – how will you control snowmelt water?
 - **R:** Jeanne Kuttel responded that DWR has read the report and has been considering various recovery alternatives in conjunction with the DSOD, consultants and FERC, and has decided to proceed with the most viable solutions based on their achievability and robustness. By the November 1st, 2017, DWR intends to repair/rebuild the gated flood control spillway to handle 270,000 cfs. Additionally, a new cutoff wall for the emergency spillway will limit the possibility of erosion in the unlikely event the emergency spillway needs to be used. DWR will follow-up with additional release capacity details.
- **Q:** How can growers seek financial relief from losses due to damaged spillway?
 - **R:** The first step is to use the process referenced in the URL provided to make a claim with the State. That URL is <http://www.dgs.ca.gov/orim/Programs/GovernmentClaims.aspx>.
- **Q:** If the gated spillway had done what it was designed to do, we would not be in this compromised position. No one actually inspected the dam or the spillway in-person. Are the people who decided to not conduct inspections still employed by the State?
 - **R:** DWR is uncertain if the past dam inspectors still work for the state (in the Division of Operations & Maintenance, and in the Division of Dam Safety), or for other inspection agencies like FERC. However, there were undoubtedly inspectors physically present during all past dam and spillway inspections, whether they were performed by DWR, FERC, or an independent board.
- **C:** Repairing the spillway is not our primary concern, it is the immediate safety of our communities that concerns us. I do not have confidence in the safety factor as there is conflicting information. I am also concerned about the sufficiency of DWR's risk mitigation efforts in the face of potential rapid snowmelt scenarios. The lake elevation can rise quickly, and it does not appear that DWR has considered this factor. Further, lake elevation levels should be lower than they are currently. This project generates immense revenue for the State and I want

to see transparency around this revenue (e.g., food growing, recreational licenses/uses, municipal uses, etc.). The dam should be a top priority for the State.

- **Q:** Were the impacts on the dam parking structure related to emergency spillway incident?
 - **R:** No. DWR reviewed the anatomy of the emergency spillway and its surrounding structures to show that there was no relationship between the emergency spillway's erosion and surrounding infrastructure.
- **C:** Farms along the Feather River have a long history of being neglected by DWR, particularly pertaining to erosion, flowage rights, and claims response issues. It is very difficult to file a claim with DWR and receive satisfactory results. Also, a UC engineer reported that there were flaws in the dam's design and construction, which suggest that the dam and spillway are vulnerable to failure (e.g., no rebar, etc.).
 - **R:** DWR commented that it is unfamiliar with any UC engineer-produced articles/reports and confirmed that there is indeed rebar in the spillway. Commenting on the spillway's stability, DWR emphasized that the thickness exceeded requirements at the time.
- **Q:** If outflow exceeds 270,000 cfs, the work on the spillway will not matter, because downstream levees cannot withstand that flow. What is the target level of outflow before it is necessary to switch from warning to evacuation outflow levels and on what timeline will notice of the escalation be provided?
 - **R:** DWR does not plan to exceed 160,000 cfs, which is critical for the public to know. The spillway and emergency spillway as a whole are designed to handle 270,000 cfs to meet regulatory requirements so that if a catastrophic storm were to occur, they would still effectively hold the elevated flows. Of note, the spillway worked effectively during the February incident; the issue was more due to the emergency spillway erosion. When high outflow levels are required, DWR Flood Operations in Sacramento coordinate with Local Maintaining Agencies (LMAs) and emergency managers to understand the cumulative potential impacts of all of the reservoir releases in the impacted jurisdictions and in the system, as a whole. LMAs communicated their perceived threat of failure based on DWR's outflow levels. This year, DWR noted that flood fights occurred on some levees when releases were at 100,000 – 110,000 cfs. DWR will make every effort to warn the public as early as possible if an evacuation is necessary.
- **C:** DWR should not plan to make releases higher than 100,000 to 150,000 cfs, given the current status of local levees. DWR needs to work on increasing the reliability of the levees before it makes any higher releases.
 - **R:** DWR is trying to help secure funding for LMAs to advance levee repairs.
- **Q:** I have concerns over the condition of the dam. Based on historic inflows, we can expect as much as 400,000 cfs to flow uncontrolled over the spillways. Given this, the proposed 30,000 emergency spillway capacity is insufficient. Additionally, flows higher than 30,000 cfs will compromise the roller compacted concrete makeup of the emergency spillway. We are requesting openness and transparency, and that DWR release the detailed plans for recovery. The Oroville Dam is not as high risk as the Folsom Dam, yet all the repairs on Folsom Dam were entirely made public. Will DWR release every detail of the plans and investigation and not hide behind national security?

- **R:** DWR cannot release all the information related to the recovery process, as there is certain information we need to keep confidential in order to protect life and property. However, DWR commits to sharing as much information as possible, including forensics information.
- **Q:** Is the plan to completely replace the upper chute and clear out the weathered rock beneath it by November 1, or will that step be a part of future repairs?
 - **R:** In the initial contract, DWR expected full replacement of the upper chute. Upon further investigation, DWR has found areas of the chute that are much thicker and may not need to be rebuilt. DWR will direct the contractor to replace the areas of the upper chute which are most vulnerable to damage by November 1.
- **Q:** How reliable is the aggregate concrete, and will it be sufficient under the rolled concrete structure? For example, does the existing base of the spillways structure need to be removed, or can construction begin on top of the existing aggregate concrete?
 - **R:** DWR indicates that much of the emergency spillway will be reconstructed using roller-compacted concrete (RCC). RCC will be placed according to structural standards approved by DSOD and FERC.
- **C:** I'm upset by the shortcuts taken on dam construction and maintenance. DWR should increase its reserve for lake inflow. What's the maximum inflow that can come into lake?
 - **R:** The maximum *recorded* inflow is 350,000 cfs.
- **C:** In 1997, which was a record rainfall year, the lake was 1 foot short of spilling over the emergency spillway, and the main spillway was releasing at approximately 160,000 cfs. The difference between a 350,000 cfs inflow and 160,000 cfs outflow is significant and would cause the reservoir to fill up rapidly (e.g., the reservoir rose 10 feet in 24 hours in 1997). After the 1997 event, did DWR change the lake reserve? The reserve should have been increased then, and it definitely needs to be increased now to accommodate snow melt.
- **R:** DWR responded that it did not change the lake reserve following the 1997 event.
- **C:** Farmers are frustrated by about receiving news from DWR that appears to have been filtered, and request a more open and transparent dialogue with the Department. Our concern is not that terrorists will get our dam's information, rather that DWR will not maintain the dam. The dam releases water in four ways as follows: 1) the spillway, 2) the emergency spillway, 3) the Hyatt Power Plant, and 4) the river valves. All four of those outlets were damaged or were not functioning at their highest capacity. These components need to be restored to their highest capacity and be well-maintained to protect us. Additionally, the clogged levee systems need to be repaired. DWR evacuated fish before humans, and did not demonstrate a concern for our well-being. Sherriff Honea did a superb job evacuating people, but we did not see any DWR staff on site to address evacuation-related issues. The concerns of those impacted should be a top priority. Will DWR support claims from those impacted by the event?
 - **R:** DWR will support legitimate legal claims.
- **C:** DWR's mismanagement of outflow has inundated my farm with water. The riverbank can handle 20,000-25,000 cfs, but DWR releases 35,000+ cfs. DWR should lower the lake's level using outflows between 20,000 and 25,000 cfs so as not to flood farmland.
 - **R:** DWR needs to ensure that the gated spillway can be used through the rest of the storm/melt season, which requires certain releases. DWR will consider the request to lower outflow to 20,000-25,000 cfs and will consult with DWR engineers on this issue.

- **Q:** There is a lack of maintenance on the entirety of the DWR levee system from Oroville to Sacramento. I should point out that there are 22 miles of unmaintained channel on Butte Creek and Cherokee Canal, which was built in the 60s has never been cleaned. DWR and the Central Valley Flood Protection Board (CVFPB) need to ensure that levee channels are cleaned and maintained, including those on Butte Creek and Cherokee Creek. Also, how is Thermalito Afterbay being run? What purpose is it serving in context of spill issues? How will we mitigate the negative impacts that the murky water has on our pumps? How do we know if the murky water will affect our rice crops? Are the Afterbay pumps being run? Can I get access to the data?
 - **R:** DWR confirms that Thermalito Afterbay provides water to many water users. With respect to the impacts of murky water, DWR does not know the answer, but the Afterbay pumps are continuously operating, based on water levels. If water is at a certain threshold in the wells, we track it and can share this information as it is public record.
- **Q:** When will the river be able to sustain a 20,000 cfs flow?
 - **R:** DWR will be considering this question in consultation with the operations team. Currently DWR plans to lower outflow from 35,000 to 30,000 cfs, and then bring the outflow back up before construction begins. DWR will consider options to keep outflow at 20,000 as requested by members of the public.
- **C:** DWR should be transparent with local residents on response and recovery information and relevant communications. Sacramento government politics should not dictate what happens in Oroville.
- **Q:** DWR has repeatedly stated that it will provide documentation and information to follow-up on many of the questions asked. How will this information be conveyed?
 - **R:** DWR will be drafting email responses and sharing information including FAQs with members of the listserv. Please share your email with DWR if you wish to receive this information. Also, DWR shares information on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, and is continually looking for opportunities to better share information. If you have a group/forum that can help disseminate such information, please let DWR know.
- **Q:** Who will be responsible for rebuilding service roads when they fail due to DWR construction traffic? Is the dam road sound enough to handle construction traffic?
 - **R:** DWR is working with Butte County and the City of Oroville, as well as anyone impacted by haul routes, on repairing service roads. DWR plans to refurbish roads as they are used for construction, and fix them when construction is finished. The dam road is rated for highway loads, so yes, it is capable of handling construction traffic.
- (Question Source: Facebook) **Q:** Are we safe now?
 - **R:** Yes, local residents are safe. DWR has mitigated concern with regard to the emergency spillway, and the main spillway can still be used. DWR is closely tracking the snowmelt process and is prepared for weather extremes. Based on the performance of the spillway and spillway gates that we have to date, we are safe.
- (Question Source: Facebook) **Q:** Will we have to evacuate again?
 - **R:** DWR encourages readiness in the face of any emergency (fire, flood, earthquake), but believes that residents are fully safe with respect to Oroville Dam and spillways. DWR compliments the Sheriff on his evacuation responsiveness, and suggests that residents

familiarize themselves with the updated evacuation maps produced by the Sheriff's department to be prepared for any evacuation situation. The Sheriff would like to convey that public safety is his number one priority.

- (Question Source: Facebook) **Q:** Will boating be allowed on the lake?
 - **R:** Yes, boating is allowed on the lake; only a small portion of the lake is closed to boating.
- **C:** I am uncomfortable with DWR's absence of transparency, and there is a general lack of trust for DWR. Oroville's safety record is poor, DWR prioritized fish before people, some evacuations only occurred thanks to transportation volunteers, there was/is little cooperation with downstream entities, and DWR failed to manage messaging and dissemination of information. There is trust for the Sheriff's Department, but not for DWR.
- **Q:** I am concerned about the structure of the dam based on evidence that sediment build-up behind the dam is distributed unequally, suggesting that there is a water drainage problem and water is making its way through the dam. This is a design flaw that needs addressing.
 - **R:** DWR is not familiar with this topic but will look into it.
- **Q:** Which agency is responsible for repairing erosion along Feather River banks? I have a property close to the river, and several trees recently fell into the river. What is the requirement to file a claim, and when is the deadline?
 - **R:** The LMAs are responsible. If you tell DWR where your property is, DWR will let you know who the responsible LMA is. As for a claim deadline, DWR will need to confirm that answer.

Closing

Bill Croyle closed the meeting by thanking everyone for attending and commenting that DWR has homework to do to follow up with the evening's information requests.

Action Items

Following are action items or next steps for DWR, which came from the meeting:

- DWR to encourage availability of evacuation plans and processes to the communities impacted in the February incident as well as those who could be impacted by potential future incidents at the dam. *NOTE: Evacuation plans are prepared and managed by local emergency management agencies and not DWR. This response incorporates additional information identified by DWR to ensure factual accuracy.*
- DWR to publicly post/release the emergency spillway hypothetical inundation map.
- DWR to publicly post/release information regarding the natural spring to confirm that it is not a leak in the dam.
- DWR to follow-up with CDFW on the loss of fish resulting from the February incident.
- DWR to publicly post/release information on spillway (both main and emergency) capacity.
- DWR to publicly post/release information on operations of the Afterbay pumps.
- DWR to further research on the issue of sediment build-up behind the dam, suggesting a possible water drainage problem.
- DWR to provide information on the responsible LMA contact for filing refund claims for property damage resulting from the February incident, as requested.

- DWR to identify relevant regulations or rules that address claims process. *NOTE: This response incorporates additional information identified by DWR to ensure factual accuracy.*